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ARTICLE
Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of
Democracy: An Iterative Relationship
Neil Walker
1 Introduction
The present paper contends that the relationship between democracy and
modern constitutionalism is possessed of a degree of complexity that is often
underappreciated, and that, unless we address that complexity, we will be unable
to come to terms with the nature of the challenge posed to constitutional think-
ing or the possibilities open to it in today’s globalizing world. The complexity of
the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism, I begin by suggesting,
is perhaps best approached and appreciated through conceiving of democracy
– understood in its most general, classical sense1 as ‘the ideal of government by
act of the people’2 – as an incomplete ideal. That incompleteness is double-edged.
It refers both to the empirical incompleteness of democracy as a notion unable to
supply its own terms and conditions of application – call this the internal dimen-
sion of incompleteness – as well as to the moral or normative incompleteness of
democracy as a guide to good government – call this the external dimension of
incompleteness. In turn, this double-edged incompleteness accounts for the con-
tingent necessity of modern constitutionalism. On the one hand, constitutionalism
justifies its place as a necessary feature of the modern political configuration – a
configuration in which, as we shall see, the values expressed by and through
democracy are undoubtedly of central importance – by answering each form of
democracy’s incompleteness. It does so both by helping to realize democracy (the
internal dimension) and by seeking to supplement and perhaps qualify democracy
(the external dimension). On the other hand, if democracy in its double incom-
pleteness requires the accompaniment of constitutionalism, those very same fea-
tures of incompleteness means that democratic considerations are insufficient to
specify in any definitive fashion the content of constitutionalism. Just as democ-
racy cannot ‘complete itself’, so to speak, so too the content of constitutionalism
as a vital means to the completion of democracy cannot be supplied solely
through the resources of democracy; that content, therefore, remains contingent
upon other normative and practical considerations. Democratic incompleteness,
in other words, remains both the main justificatory foundation for contemporary
1 Its classical origins are of course Greek. Democracy is a compound of demos (people) and kratos
(power).
2 F.W. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 1998, p. 4.
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constitutionalism and the main reason why that justificatory foundation remains
inherently fragile.
If we turn to examine the practical unfolding of the relationship between democ-
racy and constitutionalism, we can see that some of the ways in which modern
constitutionalism treats democracy along the internal and external dimensions of
incompleteness are constant or recurrent over time, just as are the types of an-
swers constitutionalism supplies. However, the ways in which democratic incom-
pleteness manifests itself, and in which constitutionalism responds to that
incompleteness, also evolve and alter over time. The relationship between consti-
tutionalism and democratic incompleteness is, in short, an iterative one.3 And the
iteration with which we are most closely concerned in the present discussion is
that which has emerged out of the current wave of globalization. The develop-
ment of a situation in which states are no longer either the exclusive sites of
democratic authority or the only constitutional entities and sources has further
compounded and complicated the ways in which democracy is rendered incom-
plete and how constitutionalism responds to that incompleteness. Nevertheless, I
conclude, the historical role of constitutionalism in political modernity as a key
means of addressing the double incompleteness of democracy remains intact
under conditions of contemporary globalization, just as does the inability of
democracy to supply some of the vital terms of constitutionalism. This conti-
nuity, crucially, has to do with the way in which the deep moral order of political
modernity remains constant even as its institutional architecture evolves. Consti-
tutionalism as a basic orientation and mobile set of techniques remains a neces-
sary support for and supplement to democracy in the global age – and this sup-
portive connection to democracy provides constitutionalism’s abiding justifica-
tion. Yet the emerging postnational constitutionalism, like state-centred consti-
tutionalism before it, remains contingent upon non-democratic considerations
– and indeed does so in a more emphatic fashion than before – so reinforcing con-
stitutionalism’s abiding normative and sociological vulnerability. This conclusion
stands as a challenge to the two dominant but opposing understandings of the
new forms of postnational constitutionalism of the global age. It sets itself apart
from these views that, on the one hand, offer a conclusive indictment of global
constitutionalism because of its weakened democratic credentials. It also sets
itself apart from those views that, on the other hand, assume that these much
weakened democratic credentials pose no problem for postnational constitutional-
ism, which may thrive through its emphasis on other, non-democratic values.
2 Constitutionalism and Democracy: A Contested Relationship
The idea that I will defend and develop below, that modern constitutionalism
stands in a double relationship to democracy, with the former both realizing and
qualifying the latter, is not one that has achieved ready acceptance. In the present
3 On the iterative quality of democracy, see S. Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, New York:
Oxford University Press 2006, chapter 2.
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Section I will try to explain why this is the case, and with what distorting conse-
quences for much of contemporary constitutional theory, including those aspects
of constitutional theory that have emerged in the global age. The critique of con-
temporary constitutional theory that I seek to develop provides a point of compa-
rison and instruction for my own subsequent theory-building.
Rather than as the kind of double or multi-level relationship that I will propose,
the relationship between modern constitutionalism and democracy demonstrates
a long historical tendency to be viewed in singular terms, as if it were capable of
being captured in just one general relational proposition. Yet there is no single
such singular sense, so to speak. Rather, the actual terms of the singular relation-
ship between constitutionalism and democracy are understood quite differently
and quite inconsistently between different writers and schools of thought. A
broad but significant historical trend is evident here. Crudely, what we have wit-
nessed is a shift from a longstanding tendency for democracy and modern consti-
tutionalism to be viewed in a relationship of mutual opposition, or at least pro-
nounced mutual tension, to one in which, with the exponential spread of a demo-
cratically centred political morality over the second half of the twentieth century,
they have come to be viewed as standing in an entirely or predominantly
mutually supportive relationship – albeit this supportive relationship is itself
accounted for on quite different grounds. What is more, with the development of
postnational ways of thinking about constitutionalism in the global age, we are
entering a new phase – one that recalls but moves beyond the dominant themes
of both predecessor phases. In response to a new and starker tension between
democracy and constitutionalism there is emerging a sharp division between two
opposing singular conceptions – between those who adhere to democracy’s cen-
trality to constitutionalism but doubt its viability in the postnational domain and
those who would make a virtue out of constitutionalism’s independence from
democracy.
But why and how has modern constitutional thinking developed along these
lines? It is important to pay attention to the adjective ‘modern’ in beginning our
account of this series of changes. The idea of a constitution, already extended
beyond its original reference to physical organisms, undoubtedly possessed a
robust pre-modern tradition. Yet, prior to the age of the modern state, the idea of
the constitution tended to be applied in political discourse in a quite different
way from its subsequent usage. It was utilized in a historical-descriptive manner,
referring – in accordance with its underlying biological metaphor – to the political
way of life of a community in quasi-organic terms. This quasi-organic structure
was traditionally imagined and portrayed in a highly concrete fashion, as the
developed ‘body politic’ – the entirety of ways and means and customs of political
life. In late mediaeval times it gradually came to refer, more abstractly, to the
institutional form and complex of the political settlement. However, it was not
until the advent of the modern state, and in particular the early peak of documen-
tary constitutionalism in the United States and France at the end of the 18th cen-
tury, that this process of abstraction was completed. The constitution now as-
sumed a doubly normative character. Not only had it begun to refer to the specifi-
cally legal mode of articulation and regulation of the body politic (as opposed to
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the institutional consequences of that articulation), but also, in a more transform-
ative stage of juridification, through the medium of the early written consti-
tutions that legal modality now came to be seen as constitutive or generative of
that body politic.4 The documentary constitution became, in Tom Paine’s words,
‘a thing antecedent to a government’,5 a blueprint of how the body politic should
be organized rather than a simple reflection of how it was organized.
It is this sense of law, and in particular constitutional law, as somehow being ‘in
charge’6 – as providing the normative lodestar for the body politic, that provides
the key to understanding how modern constitutionalism in its original concep-
tion came to be viewed as standing in a relationship of tension with democracy.
Crucially, the initial distinction – and the initial distinctiveness – of the modern
constitutional state lay in its contrast with its absolutist predecessor of the 16th
and 17th centuries. In the early absolutist form of the state there had emerged
for the first time, in reaction to the partial and fragmented authority structures
of the feudal age, a monopolization and centralization of political power as an
indivisible public domain. But, in its incipient form, that indivisible public do-
main was one in which positive law was the instrument rather than the source of
sovereign power. Subsequently, in its new ‘constitutive’ variant, constitutional
law claimed to reverse this relationship. Modern constitutionalism, therefore,
came first and foremost to be defined in functional opposition to absolutism, as a
guarantee of limited (by law) government as opposed to unlimited government. In
turn, as this notion of constitutionalism as an ideal of limited government took
hold, such a conception did not fundamentally discriminate between the different
expressions of ‘sovereign’ authority which should be the due subject of consti-
tutional jurisdictio.7 The democratic or popular form of sovereignty was as much a
form of potentially overweening and abusive authority, and so as much in need of
checking, as were the monarchical or aristocratic forms of sovereignty.
What is more, democracy remained a tenuous and unsettled as well as a suspi-
cious object of constitutional thought, since – as we shall see – the extent to
which democratic forms of government actually succeeded in taking root under
the early settlements of modern constitutionalism itself remained highly uneven,
partial and subject to frequent reversal until the mid 20th century and beyond.
Accordingly, for philosophical and empirical reasons – both because democracy
was understood to harbour its own threats to the idea of limited government and
because democratic institutions were in any case a slow and faltering develop-
4 On these historical trends, see e.g., D. Grimm, The Constitution in the Process of Denationaliza-
tion, Constellations (2005) 12, 447; M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2003, esp. chapters 3-6); C. Thornhill, Towards a Historical Sociology of Constitutional
Legitimacy, Theory and Society, 37 (2008), 161-197.
5 T. Paine, The Rights of Man, New York: St. Martin’s 1988, p. 29.
6 J. Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, Law and Philosophy
21 (2002) 17-64, 157.
7 See G. Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, American Political Science Review 56
(1962) 853-64.
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ment of the modern state8 – constitutionalism in its early modern form tended
not to place democracy at its normative centre but rather as something lurking at
the margins to be tamed and constrained.9
The semiotics of recent state-centred constitutional theory increasingly suggest
an inversion of this historical understanding. Constitutional theorists of the late
twentieth century have typically been at pains to reconcile constitutionalism and
democracy. This has much to do with the unprecedented prominence of the
democratic idea today. The 20th century has been labelled by some as the Demo-
cratic Century,10 the high point in the pursuit of ‘the ideal of government by act
of the people’.11 It is, according to Amartya Sen, the age in which democracy has
ceased to be understood in its various localities as a purely local need and has
come instead to be endorsed as a ‘universal commitment’ and so as a ‘normal’
template of government.12 Crudely, there are positive and negative reasons for
this. Positively, the 20th century, and more precisely the second half of the 20th
century, saw unprecedented success for the democratic project. By 1941, in the
depths of the Second World War, there were only thirteen countries in the world
who still could meet the most basic criteria of democratic self-government. Yet by
the end of the century, as many as 119 out of 192 states could be described as
electoral democracies.13 In numerous cases democracy remained, and remains
today, an extremely fragile flower, poorly embedded within the local political cul-
ture, threatened and compromised by myriad external pressures in a globalized
world. But even if practice often remains deficient, there is no doubting the
relentless spread of democracy’s rhetorical endorsement.
Negatively, moreover, the ideal of democratic self-government has gained trac-
tion because of the absence of credible alternative universal ideals of political
organization. For the 20th century was also the century of disillusionment, its
various and contending totalizing ideologies progressively discredited as culpable
agents in an unprecedented ‘age of extremes’.14 Fundamental belief systems,
‘thick’ and comprehensive doctrines of the good life, of course, retain a strong
sociological presence today, indeed perhaps more so now than at any time since
8 Of course, there is also a causal relationship between these two trends. One of the reasons why
democracy was such a slow developer was precisely because the constitutionalist argument for
‘limited government’ could be so effectively deployed against it, and vice versa.
9 This is not the place to document that claim in full. However, if we take only the American
debate, few would doubt Dworkin’s claim that it has until recently been ‘the near unanimous
view’ of American constitutional scholars and lawyers that a strong conception of constitutional-
ism, especially as articulated through a strong version of judicial review, is one that compromises
democracy. See Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Cam-
bridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 1996, p. 18.
10 Freedom House Report Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Cen-
tury, New York: Freedom House 1999.
11 Michelman, n. 2 above.
12 A. Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, Journal of Democracy 10 (1999), 3 -17.
13 See Freedom House Report, n. 10 above; see more generally, J. Keane, The Life and Death of
Democracy, London: Simon and Schuster 2009.
14 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short 20th Century, London: Michael Joseph 1994.
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the mid 20th century.15 However, the idea that such belief systems should prevail
as global ideals founders both on the equally implacable conviction of opposite
fundamentalisms and on the scepticism of countless others. From this perspec-
tive, democracy’s attraction is as the lesser evil; its distinction remains, according
to Winston Churchill’s famous aphorism, ‘as the worst form of government
except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’.16
But if the increasing centrality of democracy to political discourse and practice
produced significant efforts towards the reconciliation of democracy and consti-
tutionalism, the variation we find in the terms of that reconciliation betrays cer-
tain older tensions. At one end of the spectrum, there are those who tend to
‘define up’ democracy to meet a thicker sense of constitutional self-government.
At the other end of the spectrum there are those for whom constitutionalism is
‘defined down’ to meet a thinly proceduralist conception of democracy. And in
between these positions we find a wide range of options where democracy and
constitutionalism meet each other ‘half-way’, so to speak. 17
Ronald Dworkin provides a prominent example of those who would ‘define up’
democracy in ambitious terms to satisfy a thicker sense of constitutional self-
government. For him, democracy requires ‘that collective decisions be made by
political institutions whose structure, composition and practice treat all members
of the community as individuals, with equal concern and respect’.18 This
demands, therefore, not just the most basic constitutive rights and structures of
democratic participation (voting rights, the right to run for office, a reasonably
representative electoral system, legal recognition of political parties, etc.) and
other direct preconditions of democracy (most obviously, freedom of expression
and association) but a whole additional set of protections against any institution-
ally authored, facilitated or merely permitted abuses and deprivations that might
undermine equal respect and concern broadly conceived.
At the other extreme, we find positions at or close to the ‘pure procedural’19 pole,
where constitutionalism is ‘defined down’ as a means to serve the ends of a demo-
cratic process of government. This kind of stance, associated with writers such as
John Hart Ely20 and Robert Post21 in recent years, understands constitutionalism
15 See e.g., M. Ruthven, Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning, Oxford: OUP 2005.
16 Quoted in J. Keane, n. 13 above, 581.
17 For an excellent overview of contemporary constitutional theory’s treatment of democracy, and,
in particular, its tendency to view ‘constitutional democracy [as] a tautology rather than an oxy-
moron’ (90) see R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality
of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007 esp. chapter 3. Bellamy’s classifica-
tion of the ways in which constitutionalism is reconciled with democracy is more detailed than
the one I deploy in the present article, but the basic distinction between those forms of reconcil-
iation based on a ‘thickened-up’ definition of democracy and those based on a ‘thinned-down’
version of constitutionalism also informs his approach.
18 Dworkin, n. 9 above, 17.
19 To use Michelman’s term; n. 2 above, 39.
20 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press 1981.
21 R. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press 1995.
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as lacking any democracy-independent moral foundations. Instead, constitutional
thinking and the constitutional process exist only to ensure that political deci-
sion-making and the public debate that informs political decision-making is
accessible to all interests and preferences on equal terms.
If these polar positions see democracy as subservient to an idea of the ‘good’ con-
stitutional polity, or conversely, constitutionalism as subservient to democracy
conceived of as a purely procedural ideal, a third set of intermediate positions
avoids subservience in either direction but nevertheless retains a commitment to
the idea of democracy and constitutionalism as fundamentally mutually suppor-
tive ideals. Jürgen Habermas, to take a prominent and highly influential example
of this middle way, understands constitutional democracy as located in the sym-
biotic relationship between private and public autonomy in the era of political
modernity.22 The protection of a sphere of individual autonomy and the guaran-
tee of an inclusive public domain of political discourse and participation are seen
as twin and indeed co-original virtues of the modern age. And while their com-
mon origins suggest some level of moral compatibility or interconnection,23 in
the final analysis each virtue remains irreducible to the other. That is to say, there
is no relationship of normative subordination or subsumption in either direction.
There is, however, a key relationship of empirical interdependence. Not only is
private autonomy deemed to be a factual prerequisite of effective public auto-
nomy and of a healthy domain of political participation, but, reciprocally, the lat-
ter also offers the best guarantee of the continued protection of private auto-
nomy. What we have, in short, is a conception of constitutional democracy where,
unlike ‘defined up’ democracy or ‘defined down’ constitutionalism, a measure of
normative distinction between the values associated with democratic process
(public autonomy) and those associated with constitutionalism more broadly (pri-
vate and public autonomy) is conceded, but where this divergence is deemed not
to require any trade-off between them due to the mutually supportive causal rela-
tionship which obtains between the operation of the two sets of values.
These are all powerful and influential positions, but none of them tells the whole
story of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. Indeed, their
very divergence inter se offers some indication of what is missing from each. In
their desire to hold constitutionalism compatible with democracy, they tend to
paint an unbalanced picture. On the one hand, they succeed in deepening our
understanding of the ways in which certain prior constitutional notions are
indeed necessary to the articulation of democracy, and to that extent they mark
an advance from the earlier orthodoxy of modern constitutional thought as con-
cerned too much with the ‘limitation’ of ‘limited government’ and too little with
its basic ‘constitution’. On the other hand, however, in so doing they tend in their
different ways to gloss over the continuing and unavoidable tensions between
democracy and constitutionalism, and in particular the need for constitutiona-
lism to draw upon resources other than democracy in its vital role of addressing
22 See in particular, J. Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory
Principles?, Political Theory 29 (2001) 766-81.
23 This is further explored in Section V below.
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the incompleteness of democracy. Whether by straining democracy beyond the
limits of any broadly shared understanding of its terms and towards a thicker
conception of constitutionalism which arguably stands beyond and perhaps
against democracy, or by reducing constitutionalism to a purely democratic-
process supportive role and treating that supportive role as itself fully democrati-
cally specified, or by admitting some tensions between democracy and consti-
tutionalism but resolving these by resort to a speculatively serendipitous causal
formula, these theories tend to close prematurely the open question of the rela-
tionship between constitutionalism and democracy. In so doing, they cannot
grasp the iterative and indeed irresoluble quality of the tension between democ-
racy and constitutionalism, and how this may coexist with a relationship of
mutual support.
As we shall specify more fully in due course, if anything, the tendency towards a
diversity of singular understandings of the relationship between democracy and
constitutionalism is amplified in the global age. However, this development takes
place in a context where, in something of a reversal to the earlier modern tradi-
tion, democracy and constitutionalism again begin to appear in fundamental ten-
sion. On the one hand there are those, heirs to the more recent tradition of a
democratically rooted constitutionalism, for whom the very idea of constitutional-
ism is deeply imperilled by the severing of the umbilical chord connecting it to the
democratic state.24 On the other hand there are those, heirs to the earlier tradi-
tion of modern constitutionalism as a bridle upon and limitation of public power,
for whom constitutionalism can flourish anew beyond the declining range of the
democratic nation state.25 Again, in their very singularity these understandings
tend not to appreciate the overall picture, either overstating or understating con-
stitutionalism’s dependence on democracy.
3 Constitutionalism and Democratic Incompleteness
Let me now set out the basic structure of my alternative understanding of the
double relationship between constitutionalism and (incomplete) democracy. As
already noted, in this perspective constitutionalism is necessary both to realize
democracy and to supplement and perhaps qualify democracy. In so doing, consti-
tutionalism is responding to the empirical and normative dimensions of the
incompleteness of democracy respectively, and in both cases is bound to do so in
terms which cannot themselves be fully justified by reference to democratic crite-
ria. In the introductory Section it was noted that certain broad features of this
double relationship have remained constant over the period of modern constitu-
24 See e.g., D. Grimm, n. 4 above.
25 Much of the literature on the constitutionalization of international law, for all its internal diver-
sity of approach, takes this basically more optimistic line. Many representative examples of this
genre can be found in two recent edited volumes; J. L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.) Ruling
the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge: CUP 2009;
J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford:
OUP 2009.
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tionalism, and it is this continuity which allow us to disaggregate the relationship
between constitutionalism and democracy into a number of settled sub-themes or
dimensions. An examination of these sub-themes will reveal the general ways in
which constitutionalism functions to realize democracy, the general ways in
which constitutionalism functions to supplement or qualify democracy, as well as
providing a broad indication of how these two relational dimensions themselves
interrelate.
We can identify seven such sub-themes; namely authorship, stakeholding, represen-
tation, competence, non-democratic values, implementation and demarcation. The
first four sub-themes – authorship, stakeholding, representation and compe-
tence – clearly relate to the question of realizing democracy. The fifth sub-theme,
non-democratic-values, clearly refers to the supplementation or qualification of
democracy. And the last two sub-themes – implementation and demarcation –
straddle the divide between realizing and supplementing or qualifying democracy.
Let us now say rather more about the way in which modern constitutionalism has
traditionally responded to democratic incompleteness across the seven dimen-
sions.
3.1 Empirical Incompleteness; Constitutionalism as Democracy-Realizing
We will begin with the four clearly democracy-realizing dimensions of the rela-
tionship between constitutionalism and democracy. First, constitutionalism
addresses the deep question of authorship of the political community. Under what
circumstances should an expression of political voice count as an act of constitu-
tion-making or constitution-amending – as a basic initiation or adaptation of a
community as a political community and so as the appropriate container of a
democratic system of government (the when question)? Secondly, constitutional-
ism addresses the question of membership, or more broadly and more attuned to
the relevant nuances, the question of stakeholding. Whose interests and preferen-
ces should be taken into account in the operation of the democratic system (the
who question)? Thirdly, constitutionalism addresses the question of representa-
tion. Through which forms ought stakeholders, on the authority of the authors, to
be democratically represented (the which question)? And fourthly, constitutional-
ism addresses the question of prerequisite competence. What kinds of capacities
are required of the stakeholders and their representatives for them to be compe-
tent (re)producers and operators of a democratic system, and what constitutional
right and protections are necessary to furnish these capacities? In other words,
how do we ensure that the relevant actors possess the wherewithal to operate the
political system in a democratic fashion (the wherewith question)?
Let us now look at the various democracy-realizing dimensions in a little more
depth. What are the ingredients that constitutionalism supplies, without which
democracy cannot realize itself, and in what sense are these democracy-realizing
attributes dependent upon considerations other than purely democratic ones?
Take first the question of authorship. This is traditionally viewed in constitution-
al theory through the concept, first developed by Abbe Sieyes, of pouvoir consti-
tuant or ‘constituent power’. In a tract that became the effective manifesto of the
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French Revolution,26 Sieyes sought to identify an originary polity-embracing
power capable of giving birth to the constitutional settlement – the pouvoir consti-
tué – and standing in some kind of relationship of pre-eminence over it. Consti-
tuent power, therefore, speaks to the most basic sense in which constitutionalism
displays a ‘constitutive’ quality with regard to the (potentially) democratic polity.
It energizes the initial process – the constitutional convention, constituent
assembly or other device – through which is produced the initial constitutional
document for a polity (or, indeed, through which is generated any successor con-
stitutional document that announces a new founding unauthorized by its prede-
cessor), which in turn provides the necessary framing conditions and any addi-
tional norm-generating capacity for the fashioning and operation of democracy
within that polity.
Arguably, too, any amendment of the constitution, involving an alteration of the
framing document itself but in terms formally specified by the framing docu-
ment, is also an act of authorship, in this case authorized but not exercised by the
original framers, which will have a bearing on the ongoing fashioning and opera-
tion of any democratic settlement. Again here, constitutionalism provides a pre-
requisite to democracy, one that is necessary not in this latter case to ensure that
democracy ‘gets going’, as in a founding document, but rather to ensure that
democracy’s basic framing terms do not congeal and become a ‘dead letter’, insen-
sitive to any changes in conditions which might affect their contextual suitability
as basic framing terms.27
Yet constitutionalism’s supply of the terms and conditions of authorship of the
polity, although necessary to democracy, is not itself democratically determined.
There can be no definitive democratic answer to the question of who is the popu-
lar sovereign – of who gets to constitute the polity and under what conditions. As
Hans Lindahl puts it, the ‘collective self-constitution’ of a political community
‘means constitution both by and of a collective self’.28 The collective self duly con-
stituted (the of) is the product of rather than identical with the collective self con-
stituting (the by). It follows that whatever democratic credentials are possessed
by the latter duly constituted body cannot be used to provide retrospective war-
rant for the democratic credentials of the earlier constituting body, which
remains a body without any democratic pedigree beyond its own self-assertion. A
similar problem of unfounded foundations attaches, at one remove, to formal
amendments of the constitution. Here, the immediate credentials of the amen-
ding constituency are located in the founding document, which in its amending
formula specifies the terms of that constituency. However, that founding docu-
26 A. Sieyes, What is the Third Estate? (1789) (Eng. Trans. M. Blondel, New York, Praeger, 1963).
27 Of course, some part of the (controversial) argument in favour of a more ‘activist’ conception of
judicial review, and against strongly originalist conceptions of the judicial role in constitutional
interpretation, depends upon constitutional judges, in the absence of formal amendment, them-
selves assuming a quasi-amending role in response to post-foundational societal change. See e.g.,
S.M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: from theory to politics, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, chapter 1.
28 H. Lindahl, Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood, in: M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds.),
The Paradox of Constitutionalism, Oxford: OUP 2007, p. 9-24, at p. 10.
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ment is itself but the product of the self-assertion of an originary and constituent
body necessarily lacking its own democratic pedigree. Again, the work of the con-
stitution in enabling democracy possesses no definitive democratic warrant.
Of course, all this is to say is that collective selfhood is progressively as well as
regressively authorized, and so we should be wary of overstating the difficulties
the problem of origins poses to democratic theory. Democratic authority is reflex-
ively constructed over time – it is about the continuously self-amending relation-
ship of a collective self to itself rather than a seamless continuity of identity and
sameness.29 Such reflexivity, indeed, is an inevitable feature of all collective activ-
ity, however organized,30 – of all bounded contexts of decision-making, whether
or not professedly democratic. It does not mean either that the original consti-
tuent body lacks a plausible democratic claim, or that we cannot distinguish
between more or less plausible such claims.31 It is a matter of sociological investi-
gation how much contemporaneous legitimacy a self-proclaimed constituent body
enjoys amongst the constituency for whom it professes to speak, and, given the
operation of an ongoing reflexive process, later endorsements and re-endorse-
ments mean that the level of any such social legitimacy can vary over time. Yet,
these qualifications notwithstanding, there remains something arbitrary – some-
thing necessarily democratically unfulfilled and in some measure self-fulfilling
about the original constituent act and signature in its own time. The original con-
stitutional imposition of democracy, in other words, is also inevitably an imposi-
tion upon democracy.
Similar considerations apply to questions of stakeholding and representation.
The initial constitutional settlement will either specify or will provide the norma-
tive basis for specifying who counts in the polity. Categories of citizenship or
nationality will set out who are full members of the polity for the purposes of
taking part in democratic politics (in particular, voting and standing for elected
office). Constitution-level decisions will be taken, or will enable other decisions to
be taken, as to who should be ineligible (aliens), or partially eligible (those deni-
zens, for example, who may vote in local or supranational elections but not in
national elections), and how to move through the levels of eligibility (through
residence, citizenship tests, etc.). The constitutional framework will also specify,
or set out authoritative procedures for specifying which otherwise eligible catego-
ries may be disqualified (for example, prisoners or minors).32
In all cases, the identification of those who are deemed to have sufficient stake in
the polity to be full participating members of its political system, while providing
an important anchor for the democratic process, is again not itself something
that can be compellingly derived from democratic principles. Rather, just as with
29 See e.g., Lindahl, n. 28 above at14 et seq.; see also B. Van Roermund, Sovereignty: Unpopular and
Popular, in: N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford: Hart 2003, p. 33-54.
30 See e.g., H. Lindahl, Acquiring a Community, European Law Journal 9 (2003), p. 433-50.
31 See e.g. S. Chambers, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Legitimacy, Constel-
lations 11 (2004), 153.
32 For a wide-ranging study of the varied constitutional treatment of democratic membership at
both national and supranational level in the European Union, see J. Shaw, The Transformation of
Citizenship in the European Union, Cambridge: CUP 2007.
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authorship, the initial choice of constituency may create a self-reinforcing bias in
addressing the question of who counts. This is not to say that membership of the
polity is something that cannot be plausibly addressed and theoretically elaborat-
ed from a perspective of democratic principle. Many efforts have been made to do
so.33 On the one hand, membership of the demos may be seen as something that
should be restricted to those who enjoy a basic affinity and ‘we-feeling’. Those
who share a basic level and continuity of sympathetic identification, of mutual
trust and respect, and perhaps of common belief, may be seen to be a democracy’s
‘natural’ constituency. This can be defended in moral philosophical terms,
because such an approach to the determination of the ‘collective self’ in the
democratic process of ‘collective self-government’ may be animated by just those
considerations of collective autonomy as appear to be so closely ethically implica-
ted in the endorsement of the basic idea of procedural democracy itself. Addition-
ally, an affinity-based conception of political community can be defended in prag-
matic terms, because such a cohesive or solidaristic demos is advantageously
resourced to supply ‘the battery of power’34 necessary to generate effective self-
government. On the other hand, membership may be seen to be properly tied to
the impact of the polity upon one’s interests and preferences. From this perspec-
tive, democratic theory has produced many versions of the ‘all affected’ principle
to argue where the line of impact should be drawn and what the appropriate
‘impacted’ constituency of collective self-government should be in any function-
ing polity.35
Far from a dearth of democratic theory on the question of membership of the
demos, therefore, what we have in fact is a surplus. These two quite different per-
spectives, each of which also admits of a variety of different possible internal
refinements, are apt to draw conflicting conclusions, with the affinity- and affect-
based approach tending to be the more selective and the impact-based approach
tending to be the more inclusive.36 What this means is that even to the extent
that constitutional decisions as to the proper stakeholders of the polity are sensi-
tive to democratic considerations and, in the post-constituent moment, remain
open to arguments that do not simply reinforce the existing constituency’s sense
of the proper constituency, such considerations themselves are controversial inter
se and cannot provide definitive answers within the prism of democratic theory
and principle.
For their part, questions of representation suffer from a similar form of democrat-
ic underdetermination. Modern constitutionalism has been the constitutionalism
of large nation states, and the democracy it has precipitated has been of the
representative kind appropriate to large nation states rather than the assembly
33 For a recent overview, see D. Miller, Democracy’s Domain, Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009),
p. 201-228.
34 M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 1996.
35 See e.g., J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge Mass.: MIT
Press 1995; R. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests and Its Alternatives, Philosophy and
Public Affairs 35 (2007), 40-68; T. MacDonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy, Oxford: OUP 2008.
36 Miller (n. 33 above) connects these approaches to what he calls ‘L-Democracy’ (i.e., liberal) and
‘R-Democracy’ (i.e. radical) respectively, p. 204-207.
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democracy of Athenian and later small city republics. This has raised myriad ques-
tions of institutional design. How is it possible to ensure representative forms
best capable of approximating equality of influence amongst members when fac-
tors of size and internal differentiation may lead to certain interests and pref-
erences being ignored or systematically outweighed? Various systems of represen-
tation vie with each other to answer questions about the optimal allocation of
influence. Majoritarian systems of election, oriented towards rewarding parties
and constituencies possessing a relative majority throughout the entire popula-
tion with a clear mandate to govern, vie with proportional representation sys-
tems oriented towards rewarding different interests in the community in a statis-
tically accurate manner.37 Unitary systems, oriented towards treating the demos
as a cultural and institutional singularity, vie with federal or consociational sys-
tems in which the overall system of representation recognizes systematic cleav-
ages in the population in terms of sub-territorial national or regional identifica-
tion or other forms of cultural, linguistic or religious affiliation.38 Parliamentary
systems oriented towards single or coalition party government vie with presiden-
tial systems in which representative influence is channelled separately to diffe-
rent governmental organs (executive and legislative) and executive power is deem-
ed sufficiently distinct to be the subject of the special forms of empowerment and
constraint associated with the presidential office.39
In all cases, again the basic constitutional choice is democratically determining
rather than democratically determined. There is no one best democratic way how
to design a system of democratic representation. Partly, this is a question of the
different social environments of democracies demanding different institutional
solutions. However, even if we take into account the best evidence of the prior
pattern of preferences, interests and allegiances in the relevant environment,
there is no objective, situationally specific, democracy-revealing ‘fact of the mat-
ter’, but a whole host of contending considerations about how to measure and
assess effective influence. Granted, the mature representative system may well in
fact closely track the original balance of voice and influence within the collective
authorship of the polity – a link which tends to be clearest in federal or consocia-
tional systems. Yet this merely refers us back to the contingency of the initial
authorial formulation, and so demonstrates how the answers to constitutional
questions of representation, like those of authorship and stakeholding, rather
than decided in the domain of disinterested democratic principle may be strongly
path-dependent.
If we turn, finally within the category of democracy-realizing dimensions of con-
stitutionalism, to questions of competence, here somewhat different but ultima-
37 An Interparliamentary Union study of 150 democracies in 1993 revealed 83 majoritarian electo-
ral system and 57 PR systems, with the remainder mixed. Electoral Systems Worldwide: A Compar-
ative Study, Geneva: Interparliamentary Union 1993.
38 See e.g., S. Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: integration or Accommoda-
tion?, Oxford: OUP 2008.
39 See e.g., R. Elgie, From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?,
Democratization, 12 (2005), p. 106-122.
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tely similar considerations arise.40 Unlike the other three dimensions, there exists
some kind of uncontroversial core of democratically mandated constitutional pre-
requisites to democracy. Democracy, even in its thinnest proceduralist understan-
ding, requires certain minimal conditions of political and personal freedom on
the part of its stakeholders and office-holders. Without freedom of speech and
freedom of association, and without the due process rights associated with liberty
from arbitrary arrest or interference by the state, it would be impossible to guar-
antee the basic processes of opinion-formation and dissemination in the absence
of which no culture of uncoerced collective decision-making on questions of
import to that collectivity can flourish. But even within these core categories,
hard questions arise about how far we should go. Do we protect only directly
‘political speech’ or is any expression and communication of opinion on any mat-
ter of potentially public interest to be safeguarded? Do we protect only directly
political assemblies, or any forms of collective coming together, whether in the
economic or the religious sphere, that may indirectly impact upon collective polit-
ical opinion-formation and dissemination? Do we treat freedom of information
– the entitlement to have one views informed and ones preferences influenced by
the best available evidence on matters of public importance and by detailed
monitoring of the operation of public services and the behaviour of public offi-
cials – as every bit as much a prerequisite to democracy as are freedom of speech
and association? And what of privacy, property, subsistence and security? As a
simple causal thesis, are these indispensable planks of the platform necessary for
the performance of democracy, or can we conceive of a thriving democracy in
their absence, or, more likely, in their merely heavily qualified presence? And
what, too, of these competences, which may overlap considerably with those lis-
ted above, but which are defended, not (or not exclusively) on the basis that they
are causally prerequisite to democracy, but because they stand in an internal
moral relationship to democracy? That is to say, they are treated as democrati-
cally-relevant competences because they are deemed to recognize and protect just
those values which it is the moral rationale of democracy to recognize and pro-
tect – as in Dworkin’s expansive conception of the attitude of equal respect and
concern for the moral independence of all members of the community.
So once we get beyond a consensus on the core of prerequisite competences, or,
even more modestly, a consensus on the bare idea of a core which may itself begin
to fray immediately as we begin to try to delimit that core, democratic principle
and theory becomes unable to determine those competences that are required for
democracy’s own meaningful elaboration. Again, the problem is not a lack of
democratic theory, but a surfeit – one that marks out this particular question as a
key battleground for the standing controversy between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ concep-
tions of democracy. In the final analysis, there is no democratically mandated
right answer, and again constitutionalism must draw upon resources other than
democracy in answering one of the unavoidable questions about the realization of
democracy.
40 See e.g., J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: OUP 1999, chapter 13.
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In summary, therefore, we may conclude by noting a distinction between the
moral and political purpose and the social epistemology of constitutional thinking
across the four dimensions of democracy-realization. On the one hand, when
addressing the when, who, which and wherewith questions, constitutionalism
thinking and practice is geared to the realization of democracy. On the other
hand, in so doing, although there is much scope for drawing upon the resources
of democratic thinking in addressing these questions, these democratic resources
cannot provide definitive answers. Rather, from a democratic perspective a cru-
cial element of contingency remains. Other factors will inevitably play their part
in the making of key constitutional decisions, and, indeed, so intensely reflexive
are the democracy-engaging processes set in motion by constitutionalism that
there will be a tendency towards the reinforcement of foundational biases.
3.2 Normative Incompleteness; Constitutionalism as Democracy-Supplementing and
Democracy-Qualifying
Fifthly, and bringing in the second general relational vector connecting constitu-
tionalism to democracy, we may identify a broad and general democracy-supple-
menting or qualifying dimension. As we saw in Section Two, this is a domain of
constitutional theory and practice which attracts a double doze of scepticism. Not
only its content, but even its very existence stands as controversial between differ-
ent positions. In particular, any constitutional reference point outside of democ-
racy is denied by those who would reduce constitutionalism entirely to the service
of a procedural version of state democracy, just as, in the recent symbolic pomp
of democratic constitutionalism, the possibility of a non-democratic constitution-
al supplement has been glossed over even by those, such as Dworkin, and to a
somewhat lesser extent Habermas, whose much ‘thicker’ constitutional vision is
presented as nothing more than the full working out of the premises of democrat-
ic theory. Accordingly, this fifth category is one best defined negatively and open-
endedly. It addresses the question of what, if any, are the other, non-democratic
values, whether understood in terms of individual rights or collective goods that
ought to be pursued and upheld by the constitution (the what else question)?
The list of candidate values here looks very like the open-ended list we perused
previously under the democracy-realizing head of prerequisite competences. Such
individual rights as property and subsistence, together with other basic welfare or
social rights would figure prominently, as would certain public goods less easily
reduced to an aggregation of individual rights, such as security and education. So
too, at a higher level of abstraction, would some general desiderata which might
in some catalogues be seen as part of a democratic conception of the good
sensulargo, but which might equally in other moral schemes be seen as equipri-
mordial or interdependent with rather than reducible to democracy, or indeed as
deeper values served by democracy. We are talking here of values as broadly pit-
ched as equality, liberty, dignity or fraternity.41
This last category of more abstract values neither reducible to nor in conflict with
but somehow interwoven with democracy is an intriguing one, and one to which
41 See e.g., Dworkin, n. 9 above, p. 25-6. See also Waldron, n. 40 above, chapter 13.
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we return in the concluding Section. But for the moment, it is necessary to lay
down a broader marker about the knowledge claims associated with all putative
members of the category of democracy-supplementing or qualifying values. The
point here is not to seek to draw the unequivocal conclusion that the kinds of
constitutional claims which might be and frequently are made on behalf of such
individual and collective values, however concrete or abstract, are necessarily
additional to or inconsistent with democracy. That would be to make an equal
and opposite error to those who would declare with similar conviction that any
and all such constitutional values are necessarily implied by and so ultimately
reducible to democracy (however thinly or thickly conceived).
Rather, all we can confidently say is that there is no generally agreed understan-
ding of democracy on the basis of which all other candidate constitutional values
are necessarily implied by and reducible to its terms. Given the wide range of pos-
sible understandings of democracy, indeed, the most we can hope for by way of
agreement as to democracy’s core meaning is some kind of overlapping consensus
across that wide range. However, since any conception of democracy (or rather,
any shared dimension of various and diverse conceptions of democracy) capable
of attracting the requisite overlapping consensus could be no more than a thin
proceduralist one, there would remain many other candidate constitutional
values palpably not reducible to the terms of that thin consensus. In other words,
to the extent that there is or could be minimum agreement about democracy as a
cornerstone of constitutionalism, that agreement does not and could not extend
far enough to cover the many other candidate constitutional values to which at
least some parties to any such minimal agreement would subscribe. We have no
choice, therefore, when seeking to make sense of modern constitutionalism in a
way that does not close off options by (deeply controversial) definitional fiat, but
to hold open the putative category of non-democratic values.
3.3 Empirical and Normative Incompleteness: Two Mixed Constitutional Functions
We can complete our catalogue of modern constitutional functional domains by
referring to two such functions straddling the distinction between democracy-
realizing and democracy-qualifying.
Sixthly, then, constitutionalism also addresses democratic incompleteness at the
level of implementation of the overall system of government (the how question).
Just because constitutional law, uniquely amongst categories of law within the
positive legal order of the modern state, cannot resort to any higher socially sour-
ced and institutionally grounded legal authority in support of its own normative
purposes, it must take responsibility for its own effectiveness as law. This work of
self-execution can in turn be sub-divided into normative or regulatory design
questions, and integrative or cultural questions.42
Normatively, what institutional framework – that is to say, what particular com-
bination and interconnection of legislative, executive and judicial functions and
institutions, will best reflect and achieve the normative values and purposes of
42 See e.g., D. Grimm, Integration by Constitution, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3
(2005), p. 193-208.
Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 2010 (39) 3 221
Neil Walker
the constitution? Importantly, just because these deep normative purposes may
be mixed, relating to democracy and (arguably) non-democratic values alike, so
too their implementation may reflect this mixity of democracy-realizing and
democracy-supplementing or -qualifying functions. For example, an independent
emphasis on those presumptively non-democratic values based on individual
rights might be thought to be well served by a strong regime of judicial review of
legislation and of administrative discretion.43 Or a strong emphasis on the goods
of internal and external security might be thought to be well served by a strong
emergency powers regime against internal and external threats, or by protecting
certain types of executive action from close contemporaneous involvement or
scrutiny by the other branches of government.44 Equally, even to the extent that
the normative design of the constitution is only concerned with the implementa-
tion of the value of democracy, this will by no means always require democracy
‘all the way down’. Rather, even the fullest and ‘purest’ commitment to the collec-
tive procedures of self-rule will accept that the very objective of collective self-rule
will be frustrated if it is extended to very nook and cranny of decision-making
relevant to that collectivity. Rather, in order to be effective as self-rule democratic
procedures in a large and complex modern polity inevitably required be supple-
mented in some measure (the extent and forms of which, however, are themselves
a matter of significant controversy and dispute) by certain ‘depoliticizing’ mecha-
nisms that instead emphasize expertise, disinterestedness, dispassionate analysis
or deliberative rationality.45
Culturally, to what extent can the constitution assist in promoting and sustaining
the cultural conditions most conducive to its own effective implementation? This
requires us to look at the symbolic rather than the normative performance of the
constitution. We noted in our discussion of stakeholding above that democratic
theory will often favour constitutional conceptions of membership that stress the
affinity and mutual sympathy of the members. When we come to consider the
role of constitutionalism in the implementation of its own normative pro-
gramme, however, the constitution itself no longer simply reflects existing solidar-
ities. Rather, it seeks through its own symbolic resonance to cultivate existing or
new solidarities.46 Typically, it does so by means of encouraging an attachment to
itself or to its key institutions (e.g. a Parliament, a presidential office, a Supreme
Court, a monarchy), whether through the inclusive procedure or successful fact of
its generation or – more significantly in the long run – in the case of a mature
43 Although as Waldron argues, this does not necessarily follow, and a robust conception of rights
protection can be defended as compatible with a constitutionally unchecked system of majoritar-
ian legislation. See n. 40 above, chapter 10 ‘Between Rights and Bills of Rights’.
44 For a critical appraisal of these types of arguments in the post 9/11 United States environment,
see S. Holmes, The Matador’s Cape: America’s Reckless Response to Terror, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 2007.
45 See e.g., P. Pettit, Depoliticizing Democracy, Ratio Juris 17 (2004), 52-65.
46 For a comparative analysis of the different trajectories of cultivation of communal solidarities in
different constitutional models, see M. Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Self-
hood, Citizenship, Culture and Community, London and New York: Routledge 2010, esp. chapters
5-7.
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settlement, due to ‘the people attributing to [it] a metalegal meaning’ as the dura-
ble standard bearer of the ‘achievements and aspirations of society’.47 Again, as
with the normative dimension of implementation, this symbolic dimension has
to do with the effectiveness of the whole, and so it cuts across such democratic
and other values as may be contained in the constitutional settlement.
Seventhly, and finally, constitutionalism has also always asked and answered the
boundary questions of democracy (the where question). It has been required to
specify the territorial and/or functional ‘scope’48 of the polity. And like questions
of implementation, questions of demarcation have traversed the divide between
democracy-realizing and democracy-qualifying functions. On the one hand, terri-
torial questions are typically democracy-realizing. A specification of the territorial
boundaries of the polity must be made prior to the realization of a democratic
system, but in so doing it need not engage values which directly rival or qualify
democracy itself. Rather, what will be germane will be a mix of external geopolitic-
al considerations of the relative strength and overall alignment of powers within
the region and the kind of internal associative considerations we have already
encountered in our discussion of constitutionalism’s democratic stakeholding cri-
teria. A specification of the functional boundaries of the polity, on the other
hand, by defining certain spheres as in or out of democratic bounds, whether this
be the system of private property or the organization of religion, may well do so
in direct consequence of, and in furtherance of its engagement with other, pre-
sumptively non-democratic, fundamental values.
4 The Global Age of Constitutionalism
It is this seventh constitutional function of demarcation, as we shall see, that has
been radically transformed under contemporary conditions of globalization. But
why and how has this happened?
If we think of globalization as speaking to the various intersecting ways in which
different circuits of power and influence cut across national boundaries with
increasing intensity,49 then we can begin to appreciate how this leads to changes
in our understanding of constitutionalism in general and constitutionalism’s rela-
tionship to democracy in particular. In a nutshell the constitutionally relevant
effects of the growth of various transnational circuits of power and influence to
which the contemporary wave of globalization refers, from the increasing flow of
capital, goods, people and services, to the growth of new communications media,
to new intercultural influences and institutional forms, can be categorized under
the heads of new challenges, new opportunities and new preferences respectively.
As regards challenges, present day state democracies increasingly find themselves
impotent to deal with issues that take the form either of externalities – how deci-
47 D. Grimm, n. 42 above, at p. 204.
48 R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, Legitimizing the Euro-‘Polity’ and its ‘Regime: The Normative
Turn in EU Studies’, European Journal of Political Theory 2 (2003), 7-34.
49 For a representative range of contemporary thinking on globalization, see A. Jones, Globalization:
Key Thinkers, Cambridge: Polity 2010.
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sions taken in one state have a serious impact on people living in other states –
or, relatedly, of new collective action problems that can only be resolved by co-
ordination or co-regulation at a transnational level. Whether we are dealing with
global banking and investment markets, the flow of refugees, transnational crimi-
nality, the spread of infectious diseases or global climate change, individual states
increasingly lack the rules and resources to address the relevant questions on
their own. Alongside these challenges and constraints, and acting both as res-
ponse and reinforcing cause, there are new opportunities for co-ordination. Since
the middle of the 20th century, with the initial impetus provided by the post-war
internationalism of the United Nations, there has developed a range of global and
regional institutions and regulatory forms possessing a mixture of territorial and
functional jurisdiction. These institutions and forms are empowered to address
new transnational regulatory problems, but they also contribute to them in two
ways. They do so first, by further disempowering state institutions – for example,
the EU by introducing a single currency and by limiting state aids to national eco-
nomic concerns in the name of economic union, severely restricts the way in
which individual member states can respond to a domestic economic crisis.50
They do so secondly, by providing the means not just to respond to existing pro-
blems but to produce new forms of transnational interconnectedness, for exam-
ple, less restricted cross-border movement of persons, corporations, goods and
services, which in the scale and intensity of activity and interconnection they en-
able (e.g. more multinational corporations with a stake in many states, more
interdependent transport, more interdependent money markets, larger dual
national or denizen communities) in turn generate new externalities and new col-
lective action problems. At the level of preference structures, too, globalization is
a double-edged sword. The development of transnational interests and value
structures can create new global or universal normative standards and vernacu-
lars – for example as regards human rights.51 Yet by bringing different cultures
into overlap, it can also create new or heightened oppositions and enmities, as
with the rise of new forms of regionally sourced fundamentalism.52
The regulatory circuits that develop within this complex set of movements affect
the demarcation dimension of constitutionalism in two apparently opposite but
connected ways, with various ramifications for other dimensions of constitutio-
nalism. In some cases, globalization engenders more and more heavily overlap-
ping boundaries relevant to constitutionalism, while in others, by contrast, it dis-
penses with the logic of boundaries altogether.
Globalization engenders more boundaries and more heavily overlapping bounda-
ries to the extent that it encourages the creation of new post-state polities, para-
digmatically the EU, but increasingly too the other regional economic unions,
which no longer stand in a relationship of mutual exclusivity with each other or
50 As was spectacularly illustrated in the Greek debt crisis of the early Summer of 2010.
51 See e.g., C. Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive?, Cambridge: CUP 2005.
52 See e.g., Ruthven, n. 15 above.
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with state polities.53 That is to say, the more basic integrity of boundaries under
the modern state system, the sense that the constitutional limits, wherever
marked out, would be coincidental with the limits of other constitutional polities,
and that in this way internal sovereignty would be aligned with external sover-
eignty, no longer holds. This in turn creates two sets of difficulties, which we may
again illustrate through the example of the EU as an entity notorious both for its
‘democratic deficit’ and for its institutional complexity. On the one hand, by divid-
ing up democratic functions into a greater number of polity ‘slices’, the EU threa-
tens vital resources of democracy-enabling political culture at both state and
post-state level. On the other hand, as the political life of individuals and commu-
nities is increasingly dispersed across a variety of polities, the complex and
obscure technology of the coordination and co-articulation of these different re-
gimes becomes key to life-chances.
On both of these counts, each of constitutionalism’s democracy-realizing func-
tions become more urgent, more stretched and more likely to encounter prob-
lems. As the aborted constitutional settlement of the EU in 2003-5 demonstra-
ted, authorship problems are compounded in a postnational unit whose constitu-
ent power – perhaps the European people, perhaps the European peoples, or per-
haps a mixture of the two – is a matter of deep dispute, not least because it over-
laps the sources of constituent power of the pre-existing states.54 Membership
criteria, too, become more problematic in the European Union when one is deal-
ing with a secondary political community in which every citizen is always already
a citizen of a primary state community, and where the presence of both intra-EU
second country nationals and non-EU third country nationals provide a more gra-
duated and less clearly demarcated sense of distance from the citizenship core
than under the traditional insider/outsider dichotomies of one-dimensional state
citizenship.55 For their part, constitutional systems of democratic representation
have been predicated on the exclusivity of the democratic arenas they inhabit,
and it becomes difficult to make constitutional sense of representative prospects
and possibilities when this logic of exclusivity is displaced. Arguments about
federalism take on a new dimension in political configurations that are multi-
level rather than just two-level; arguments about consociationalism become more
complex when the number of overlapping minorities expands; arguments about
the relative merits of strong parliamentarianism or presidentialism are confoun-
ded when there are a multiplicity of parliaments and presidents located at differ-
ent levels.56 What is more, if we turn to the democracy-realizing dimension of
constitutional implementation, the new split and multi-level system produces not
only problems of complexity at the normative level but also motivational pro-
53 See e.g., my Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the global disorder of norma-
tive orders, International Journal of Constitutional Law 7 (2008), 373-396.
54 See my Post-Constituent Constitutionalism in the EU, in: Loughlin and Walker (eds.), n. 29
above, p. 247-268.
55 See e.g., Shaw, n. 32 above: N. Walker, Denizenship and Deterritorialization in the EU, in: H. Lin-
dahl (ed.), A Right to Inclusion and Exclusion?, Oxford: Hart 2009, p. 261-72.
56 See e.g., V. Bader, Complex Citizenship and Legitimacy in compound polities (MLPs and MLG):
The EU as example, EUROSPHERE, WP 1 (2008).
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blems at the cultural level. Much of the criticism of the EU constitution as a false
constitution, or as a ‘low intensity constitution’,57 or as a treaty masquerading as
a constitution, and much of the popular endorsement of that criticism in the
backlash against the constitution culminating in the referendum defeats of 2005
in France and Holland, had to do with the perceived symbolic overkill of political
elites seeking to attach the rhetoric of constitutionalism to such an apparently
deracinated political form as a post-state polity.58
This multiplication of boundaries stands in stark contrast to the other self-styled
postnational constitutional development. For a second form of constitutional ini-
tiative for the global age concerns the attribution of constitutional credentials to
normative phenomena that are not in any strong sense polity-specific or polity-
demarcated. Elsewhere, I have discussed many of these trends under the heading
of ‘beyond the holistic constitution’.59 The holistic constitution, again with the
state as its paradigm form, is a constitution that seeks to embrace and contain
the polity as whole and at a number of different levels simultaneously – in terms
of formal legal sovereignty and comprehensive institutional design as much as in
terms of the exclusivity of the underlying claim to popular political sovereignty or
the reference to a distinct political and cultural ‘society’. Even where these latter
thick elements are in jeopardy, there may, as in the case of the EU, still be a holis-
tic element at the level of ‘own’ legal system and institutional design. In the new
post-holistic constitutionalism, in contrast, constitutional claims are far more
partial, constitutional traces far more fragmentary. They concern regional or glo-
bal human rights treaties, the specific peace-keeping dimensions of the UN Char-
ter, or developed single issue ‘sectoral’60 treaty regimes in areas such as climate
change or international crime. They concern the thin universalism of certain core
principles of customary international law. They concern private or hybrid public/
private self-regulatory regimes for transnational functions such as sport (e.g.
IOC, FIFA) or the internet (e.g. ICANN). What these highly diverse forms have in
common is their lack of holistic attributes, their absence of claims to comprehen-
sive authority in any register, whether legal, institutional, political or societal. The
multi-layered regulatory intensity and self-sufficiency of the holistic polity is sub-
stituted by the open-ended scope and connectivity of a more networked pattern
of regulation. What is more, to the extent that these initiatives are proclaimed to
be constitutional – and it is striking how widespread the language of constitutio-
nalism has become in certain old corners of international law as well as in some of
57 See M. Maduro, The Importance of Being Called a Constitution; Constitutional Authority and the
Authority of Constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3 (2005), 332-356.
58 See e.g., my Not the European Constitution, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
15 (2008), 15-21.
59 See my Beyond the Holistic Constitution?, in: P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of
Constitutionalism?, Oxford: OUP 2010, p. 291-308.
60 A. Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community, in: J. Klabbers, A. Peters and
G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford: OUP 2009.
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the new functional regimes61 – they tend to concentrate on values other than
democracy, and so focus on what we traditionally understood as the democracy-
qualifying and supplementing functions of constitutionalism when applied in
state-democratic setting. For the mixture of individual rights and public goods
with which the new forms of transnational post-holistic constitutionalism are
typically concerned, from peace and environmental security to consumer sover-
eignty and the protection of ‘first generation’ freedom and ‘second generation’
social rights, are those that are quite widely understood as distinctive from and
perhaps challenging to democracy, or at least as in keeping with an expansive
sense of democracy’s meaning and purposes.
5 The Resilience of Democratic Incompleteness in Constitutionalism’s
Global Age
Earlier I suggested that the onset of the global age of constitutionalism has gen-
erated a new opposition. There is an increasingly sharp division of views between
those who see the constitutional paradigm as approaching exhaustion in the glo-
bal age and those who see it as undergoing a transformation and reinvigoration.
The former tend to concentre on the hollowing out of state polities as the tradi-
tional hosts of democratic constitutionalism, the depleted democratic credentials
of post-state polity alternatives, and the one sidedness of a post-holistic constitu-
tionalism seemingly remote from any idea or practice of democracy.62 The latter,
while by no means necessarily unconcerned about the fate of national or post-
national democracy,63 concentrate instead on the added value of the new trans-
national forms.
What both of these positions deny or downplay, in their very different ways, is
the continuing significance of constitutionalism’s double relationship with democ-
racy. On the first view, there is no or limited value in looking to the non-democ-
61 For critical perspectives on the spread of international constitutional discourse, see M. Kos-
kenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, Modern Law
Review 70 (2007), 1-30; D. Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in Dunoff and Tracht-
man, Ruling the World?, p. 37-68.
62 See Grimm, n. 4 above. See also essays by Loughlin (What is Constitutionalization?, p. 47-72)
and (Grimm The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World, 3-22)
in: Dobner and Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?
63 One important sub-distinction here is between those like Anne Peters (see her Compensatory
Constitutionalism; The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Struc-
tures, Leiden Journal of International Law 19 (2006), 579-610, who talk about the ‘compensatory’
quality of constitutionalism at the postnational level, so acknowledging the basic loss to consti-
tutionalism (as well as to democracy) as a whole occasioned by the diminution of democratic con-
stitutionalism at the national level; and those who believe that the trend in favour of the redirec-
tion of constitutionalism towards non-democratic transnational settings, while undoubtedly
transformative of the role of constitutionalism, does not necessarily entail any depletion in the
value of constitutionalism as a regulatory ethic (see. e.g. essays by G. Teubner, Fragmented Foun-
dations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State, and by U.K. Preuss, Disconnecting
Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?, in: Dobner and
Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?
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ratic virtues of constitutionalism in and across settings where these are not
balanced by democratic capacity and by the forms of constitutionalism associated
with realizing that capacity. Constitutionalism as a means of realizing democracy,
from this perspective, is so central to the constitutional function that any consti-
tutionalism that professes itself as such in the absence of realized or realizable
democratic forms is wholly or largely dismissed. On the second view, by contrast,
the forms of constitutionalism at the postnational level are reckoned to be in no
sense compromised by their lack of democratic credentials.
In conclusion, I want to argue that each position dismisses the relevance of con-
stitutionalism’s other relationship to democracy too quickly. As regards the
defenders of postnational constitutionalism without democracy, ideological and
meta-democratic considerations counsel against any complacent acceptance of
their position. As for those who hold postnational constitutionalism to be value-
less or essentially diminished due to the declining resonance of state democracy,
broader structural and moral consideration demand that this position likewise be
not too readily affirmed. In either case, it is at root the resilience of constitutional-
ism’s double relationship to democracy which prompts this conclusion.
Let us take first the two objections that might be levelled against those who
would defend postnational constitutionalism without democracy. Ideologically,
constitutionalism, for all the fashionable claims of today’s postnational adherents
concerning the global appeal of the values it represents, has traditionally been a
situated discourse. It has nurtured and preserved its authority as being embedded
within a particular political setting. Constitutional design in some respect in-
spired by general constitutional thinking may frame the particular polity, but the
particular polity also provides a vital context for the authoritative interpretation
of constitutionalism’s framing values. When, for example, Habermas talks of con-
stitutional patriotism,64 his pivotal point is that the general values of constitutio-
nalism have to be adopted by a community as their own before they can achieve
any ideological resonance. Their patriotism is not centred on the ideas of consti-
tutionalism in the abstract, but on general constitutional values as mediated and
concretized through their own particular political and cultural history. The in-
creased and increasingly effective mobility of constitutional ideas,65 it follows, is
not based upon the infinite scope of an abstract universalism, but upon the con-
text-variant replicability and adaptability of a particular model of political
thought across different times and places. And so it is that constitutional thought
finds it hard to gain traction in non-polity embedded connects. It further follows
that we should be suspicious of the impact and value of a purely ‘external’ and
polity-disembodied academic discourse of constitutional thought – of those
claims that find no or only faint echo and those labels that find little endorse-
ment, say, in the actual insider self-understanding and practice of this self-regula-
ting transnational entity, or of that global functional regime, or of these general
regimes of international law.
64 See e.g., the essays collected in his The Postnational Constellation, Cambridge: Polity 2001,
M. Pensky trans.).
65 See e.g., S. Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge: CUP 2006.
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Secondly, and closely related to the question of the presence or absence of a situ-
ated polity, as a matter of historical practice, even where constitutionalism invol-
ves the qualification of democracy, the terms of such qualification tend to possess
a meta-democratic pedigree. The idea of a popular sovereignty and constituent
power, as we have seen, is an early and central theme of political modernity. It is
one that predates effective operational democracy, and one, consequently, that
does not necessarily imply a democratic form of government. Yet its performative
meaning is itself as a form of higher order- or meta-democracy – of a democracy
about democracy (or about whatever other form of quotidian political organiza-
tion is chosen). An apparent difficulty with most postnational forms of constitu-
tionalism, therefore, is that as well as not being grounded in quotidian democra-
tic arrangements, they typically lack even this kind of meta-democratic founding.
Where the absence of such foundations is not simply ignored or passed over as an
unavoidable deficit by the defenders of postnational constitutionalism, democrat-
ic authority is either claimed to be supplied indirectly – a pooled delegation of
national democratic authority, or dismissed as somehow irrelevant or even in-
appropriate to the non-democratic values and forms of political organization with
which it is concerned.66 But such responses are not convincing. As regards the
argument from delegation, this raises structural questions, duly considered
below, to which as we shall see no fully satisfactory answer can be given. As
regards the redundancy argument, the notion that non-democratic values and
forms do not in any case require a democratic pedigree can be quite simply turned
on its head. As we saw in our discussion of the traditional dimensions of the rela-
tionship between constitutionalism and democracy, both the question of the exis-
tence and content of non-democratic constitutional values and that of the nature
and extent of non-democratic forms of implementation of even the most proce-
durally unimpeachable general systems of collective self-rule, are themselves con-
troversial. All the more reason, then, that a democratically aware transnational
constitutionalism endeavour to ensure that such non-democratic values and
forms retain some kind of meta-democratic imprimatur and backstop accountabi-
lity.
Yet while these factors pose difficult challenges to postnational constitutiona-
lism, and ensure a sceptical reception for it beyond the narrow academic or spe-
cialist confines where it is sponsored, we should not push this too far. The ideas
of postnational constitutionalism should not be dismissed out of hand just
because they lack a polity-specific embedding or a meta-democratic pedigree, and
so just because they may perform no democracy-realizing function within a dis-
crete polity. Again, there are two reasons for this.
66 The delegation argument is more often implicit than explicit. Even Habermas, with his strong
commitment to directly engaged forms of democracy, seems to accept a kind of delegated legiti-
macy for the global (if not the regional) level in his defence of the United Nations as one player
in a multi-level transnational constitutional settlement; see J. Habermas, Does the Constitutio-
nalization of International Law still have a chance?, in: J. Habermas, The Divided West, Cam-
bridge: Polity 2006, C. Cronin trans.), p. 115-193.
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First, in structural terms, we have already noted that in the global age of overlap-
ping polities and of individual and community life-chances becoming spread
across different polity sites, the relational dimension is key. No less important in
the assessment of overall constitutional legitimacy than the discrete democratic
credentials of a particular constitutional setting, therefore, are the ways in which
particular constitutional points and vectors, themselves lacking in democratic
credentials, may connect to other more strongly democratic settings in the rele-
vant constitutional constellations of particular actors or communities; for exam-
ple, the ways in which a regional human rights catalogue such as the European
Convention of Human Rights of the (democratically attenuated) Council of
Europe informs judicial review of legislative and executive action in the procedu-
rally democratic (or, at least, aspirationally democratic) environment of 47 Euro-
pean states. This is not to say, of course, that every non-democratic site is some-
how fully democratically homologated through the option of the adoption of its
norms by the traditional democratic site of the state. Rather, it is to suggest that
if any integrated assessment of constitutional legitimacy has always depended
upon how constitutionalism responds to the two forms of democratic incomple-
teness – addressing the ways in which democracy requires to be realized at the
same time as addressing the ways in which democracy requires to be supplemen-
ted or qualified – then the new forms of constitutional connections available
between constitutional sites means that this is an assessment which may now
plausibly be made across sites and not merely within one.
Such a response, however, tends to accept much of the force of the ideological and
meta-democratic critique. Its aim is somehow, through an idea of democratic
pedigree and delegation or transfer, to reconnect a constitutionalism of non-
democratic values with a democratic source. To that extent it will always remain
vulnerable to the objection that in the global age the connection becomes an at-
tenuated one, essentially second best to a single and holistically conceived polity
solution. Indeed, the trend within the global regulatory configuration towards an
ever more complex range of private and hybrid transnational forms is exacerbat-
ing this problem, rendering national democratic pedigree an ever more remote or
even irrelevant source of endorsement without necessarily revealing new and
alternative sites and forms of democratic pedigree.67
67 One obvious alternative source of democratic pedigree is the regional polity, and this has been a
central theme in the debate over the constitutional legitimacy of the EU (see references at
n. 54-58 above). Less obviously, but just as significant if not more significant in the long term, a
case may be made for viewing certain functionally specialist self-constituting transnational pri-
vate or hybrid regimes as democratic, or at least as its functional equivalent. They may be argued
to be so to the extent that they seek to give voice to those interests most affected in their narrow
focal policy field against a backdrop of the proliferation of other such specialist self-constituting
sites and associated ‘democratic’ opportunities and a corresponding decline in influence of holis-
tic state polities; see e.g., Teubner, n. 63. The kind of deep transformation of the very context of
democracy contemplated here takes us to the heart of the question of the relationship between
the resilient moral order of modernity and its changing architecture considered in the text below.
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However, there is a deeper response to postnational constitutional scepticism.
This response turns not on a structural connection but instead on an as yet insuf-
ficiently acknowledged internal moral connection between constitutionalism in
its democracy-realizing and democracy-qualifying modes.
We can approach this by asking the broad question of how constitutionalism fits
into what Charles Taylor calls the overall ‘moral order’ of modernity – referring to
our most basic ‘natural’, unremarked and so often invisible understanding of the
world and of our place and purpose in it.68 From that perspective, the age of
modern constitutionalism was not just about an innovative political architecture
centred on the modern state. It was also the age at which a new cluster of
mutually reinforcing values gradually came to define the deeper moral order; in
particular individualism, egalitarianism,constructivism and progressivism. The idea
of the individual as the basic moral unit in the world, and the consequential
notion of the presumptive equality of all such basic morel units, replaced the
medieval idea of human existence as part of an integrated whole in which differ-
ent strata of society were accorded distinct stations and roles. Additionally, the
notion that the world is constructed from our own evolved knowledge and prac-
tice, and that, over secular time, we seek to improve the world on our own terms
on the basis of that knowledge and experience, is new to the modern age. It re-
placed the idea of human understanding, conduct and striving being oriented
towards or judged against a pregiven order of things, situated not in secular time
but in some sacred or otherwise ‘higher’ metaphysical time. In other words, indi-
vidualism succeeded holism, equality succeeded status, constructivism succeeded
essentialism and finite progress succeeded infinite conformity. The modern world
was now, for the first time, something to be made over in their own terms by pre-
sumptively free and equal individuals.69
Arguably, it is these elements of the moral order and its associated social imagi-
nary that provide the deep context out of which our modern understanding of
constitutionalism and democracy alike emerge. Crucially, although the relation-
ship between the two purposes of constitutionalism – the articulation of demo-
cracy as the motor of a constructive and progressive approach to the world by free
and equal individuals and associations of individuals and the qualification of
democracy in term of other individual rights and collectively accomplishable and
beneficial goods on the basis of the very same cluster of deep commitments to
individualism, equality and designed progress – remains problematic and contro-
versial, we can begin to see how these twin purposes belong together notwith-
standing such continuing conflict. For constitutionalism and democracy are
joined not in the sense that one conceptually reduces to or is assimilated by the
other, or that they are otherwise fully mutually presupposed, or because they are
bound in a relationship of necessary and sufficient mutual causality. Rather, they
are joined in the sense that they emerge from and refer back to the same under-
lying moral order – they are woven out of the same moral fabric – and so are in-
68 C. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham: Duke University Press 2004, p. 3.
69 See further, R. Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001;
R. Dahl, OnPolitical Equality, New Haven: Yale University Press 2006.
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extricable even as they remain in mutual tension. What is more, this very combi-
nation of mutual inextricability and mutual tension helps to account for how – as
trailed in Section 2 above – our contemporary political and constitutional theory
expends so much effort in the infinitely suggestive but ceaselessly controversial
exercise of working out the precise relationship between them.
Two important implications follow from this understanding of the character of
the underlying moral order. First, the grand and remorseless project of working
out the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy cannot be resol-
ved by reference to some definitive and singular formula embracing both. That is
why, indeed, the exercise is infinitely suggestive and ceaselessly controversial. For
if the underlying moral order could be reduced to any such deeper foundational
terms, then this would simply be another – in this case hierarchical – route, to the
perfect compatibility of democracy and constitutionalism. But what we have, to
repeat, is inextricability without perfect compatibility – hence the double aspect
of constitutionalism as a means both to realize and to qualify democracy.70
Secondly, on this view of the crucial and resilient importance of the underlying
moral fabric of modernity, the long familiar pattern of state-centred democracy
and state-centred constitutionalism as a response to the double incompleteness
of democracy can no longer be elevated to the ‘one best way’ of collective self-
design. Rather, this supplies no more than one particular and ultimately contin-
gent architectural formation for the modern moral order.71 And if the environ-
ment which supports that architecture alters, as it has gradually done in the glo-
balizing age, and it becomes no longer possible to arrange the political world as a
series of mutually exclusive state polities, then we need to find, and, crucially, we
may be capable of finding an adjusted architecture to accommodate the underlying
moral order rather than assume that there was only ever one political architec-
ture fit for modernity.72
From this perspective, constitutionalism’s ambivalent, double-edged relationship
to democracy remains vital to the political understanding and regulation of the
global age. For that ambivalence continues to capture something key about the
nested centrality, rather than the singular pre-eminence, of democracy to the
moral order of modernity. It reminds us that constitutionalism must continue to
seek to articulate and realize democracy at the same time as it endeavours to qual-
70 A similar double-edged relationship of interdependence and tension is set out in a series of
highly suggestive recent works by Gianluigi Palombella. For him, the meta-regulatory dilemma,
at once both productive and irresoluble, that is confronted and addressed by our deepest sense of
national and transnational legality, lies between the particular collective ‘good’ and the universal
‘right’. According to Palombella, the Rule of Law – or the basic constitutional integrity of our
overall political order – depends upon the guarantee that collective will and universal reason be
held in dynamic balance, with neither ultimately prevailing over or subsuming the other. See e.g.
The Rule of Law and its Core, in: G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds.), Relocating the Rule of Law,
Oxford: Hart 2009, p. 17-42; The Rule of Law as an Institutional Ideal, in: L. Morlino and
G. Palombella, The Rule of Law and Democracy: Internal and External Issues, Leiden: Brill 2010.
71 I discuss the relationship between the moral-imaginary and architectonic aspects of political
modernity from the perspective of constitutionalism in greater detail in The Global Age in the
Longue Durée of Constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming).
72 See discussion at n. 67 above.
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ify and challenge democracy in ways that are nevertheless justifiable from democ-
racy’s broader moral horizon – even if this drama will no longer be played out in
full across each and every mutually exclusive and neatly replicable state form, but
distributed unevenly over the networked space of global society.
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